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Antisocial Feminism? Shulamith Firestone, Monique Wittig, and Proto-Queer 
Theory 
 
LISA DOWNING 
 
Much so-called ‘second-wave’ feminism of the 1970s and 1980s is relatively little 
read and often maligned today, on the basis of what is currently politically 
fashionable. Questions of exclusiveness on the part of prominent names of the 
second-wave feminist movement are chief among the reasons why this literature and 
its ideas are dropping out of favour. We are now in an age of intersectional third-wave 
feminism, a feminism that has been described as defining itself ‘“against” rather than 
just “after” the second wave’.1 In what follows, I will firstly offer a critique of the 
effects of some recent iterations of intersectional feminism. I will then propose that 
reading certain second-wave feminist texts – here texts by Shulamith Firestone (1945-
2012) and Monique Wittig (1935-2003) – through the lens of queer ethics and 
theories of normative power, rather than through the contemporary, third-wave, model 
of intersectionality (the tests of which they inevitably fail), may bring to light the still-
relevant political value of older texts.  
 
Intersectionality and its Discontents 
The theory of ‘intersectionality’ was first expounded in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
influential article ‘Demarginalizing the Intersections of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine’ (1989), which sought to show how 
looking at the position of black women with regard to discrimination law can avoid 
thinking of oppression erroneously as ‘disadvantage occurring along a single 
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categorical axis’.2 The discrimination claims against employers brought by the 
women of colour discussed in Crenshaw’s article were dismissed on the basis that 
neither discrimination on the grounds of sex nor on the grounds of race could be 
proved. (General Motors hired both white women in customer-facing roles and black 
men on the factory floor). Crenshaw demonstrates how the discrimination 
experienced by these women was located precisely at the crossroads of their sex and 
their race – a place that is neither occupied nor often seen by white feminists. While 
the ideas contained in Crenshaw’s article offered a valuable and much-needed 
corrective to the blinkered, white-centric perspective of the law, and would influence 
feminism and critical race studies inside the academy in much-needed ways, the 
politics that it would go on to inspire in the twenty-first century has expanded 
considerably from Crenshaw’s aims. In the decade of the 2010s, with much feminist 
and social justice activism being played out online, ‘intersectionality’ has become a 
ubiquitous ideology in feminism to the point that the slogan ‘my feminism will be 
intersectional or it will be bullshit!’, coined by Flavia Dzodan as the title of an article 
for Tiger Beatdown in 2011,3 has morphed into an Internet meme. It is instructive and 
important to note that this meme has since been marketized in order to profit others 
than Dzodan – in fact this feminist of colour has not seen a penny from the 
commodification of her words.4 Moreover, these words are often accorded the status 
of a moral truism, questioned at the price of shaming or of feminist excommunication, 
with many – often white and ‘privileged’ – feminists policing each other’s 
intersectional credentials.  
When second-wave feminism is evoked, it is commonly seen to fail the test of 
intersectionality. Mann and Huffman write:  
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The second wave of American feminism was often blind to 
the ways its theories and political praxis failed to adequately 
address the everyday concerns of women of color and 
ethnicity […]. It was also blind to how it appeared to many in 
the younger generation as an austere and disciplinary 
feminism. […] By contrast, the new discourse of the third 
wave embraced a more diverse and polyvocal feminism that 
appealed to those who felt marginalized or restricted within 
the second wave.5  
 
While the criticisms of the Anglophone second wave’s white-centrism are undeniable, 
the language used here is significant. The third wave is presented as the ethical 
corrective to earlier feminism – and as a superior mode. This is, in itself, problematic, 
Firstly, the imposition of the political values of one age onto those of an earlier one is 
an anachronism which promotes a simplistic narrative of progress whereby each 
generation is assumed to be more ‘enlightened’ than the previous one. Secondly, it 
risks resulting in a kind of historical purge and a programmatic silencing of earlier 
voices. And thirdly the naming of second-wave radical feminism as ‘authoritarian’ is 
perhaps a little ironic, given that the trend for no-platforming and purity-testing 
carried out in the name of twenty-first-century social justice politics is at least as well 
suited to such a descriptor.   
In an article written by a second-wave socialist feminist responding to some of 
the accusations levelled by twenty-first century feminists at 1970s activism, Linda 
Gordon argues that contemporary uses of intersectionality ‘can signal a kind of 
pluralism, in which identities are represented as equivalents on a field of competing 
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interest groups’ and which then ‘rely on essentialist assumptions’.6 Gordon adds that: 
 
 [T]he focus on representing various categories of people 
presupposes innate homogeneity within each category […]. 
Thus efforts to bring representatives of different races or 
sex/gender identities may assume that each person represents 
her or his entire race, sexual preference, for example.7 
 
A glance at the prominent website Everyday Feminism, which subtitles itself 
‘Intersectional Feminism for your Everyday Life’, illustrates this at once atomizing 
and reifying tendency nicely, as its posts are organized according to categories, 
ranged in the toolbar, including: ‘race’, ‘disability’, ‘class’, ‘religion’, ‘trans and 
GNC’ (gender non-conforming).8 Twenty-first-century intersectionality, then, at once 
promotes a particular version of individuality (so that each person needs to think 
themselves in terms of the particular multiple oppressions to which they are subject 
and the particular privileges from which they benefit – that then becomes the sum of 
their situated political identity), whilst simultaneously ignoring or censoring both 
systemic-oppression-aware or class-based analysis, such as that on which much 
second-wave feminism rested, and also the possibility of eccentric individual dissent 
or what I have called elsewhere ‘identity category violation’.9 It also leads, 
potentially, as Naomi Zack points out in her call for a less divisive ‘inclusive 
feminism’ than intersectionality has spawned, to ‘a fragmentation of women that 
precludes common goals as well as basic empathy’.10 The danger, then, lies both in 
imposing a very specific way of understanding individuality and in preventing the 
making of strategic common cause.  
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Further to Gordon’s ‘musings’, it is important to recognize that the heuristic of 
intersectionality is not the only, and perhaps not the most fruitful, model with which 
to analyse the ongoing relevance of the contribution of out-of-favour second-wave 
white feminists to present-day concerns. In what follows I argue that queer theory, 
which refuses the reification of identity, may be the most fruitful framework with 
which to reassess the second wave. The model of power that was borrowed to 
mobilize queer theory is Michel Foucault’s concept of a force-field of power 
relations, rather than a top-down hierarchy; a system in which ‘there is no single locus 
of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary’.11 While this de-centring of a dominant or hegemonic subject of 
resistance may sound convincingly intersectional at first glance, what is being 
described here is not a pluralization of identities, but precisely a rejection of identity 
tout court in favour of an understanding of a ‘plurality of resistances’12 – that is a 
plurality of resistant strategies. The model Foucault proposes for a better 
understanding of how power works is ‘normative’ power, a power that positions 
others as inside or outside of norms; as acceptable or unacceptable subjects and 
positions. A crucial insight for this kind of project, and one which is too seldom 
acknowledged, is that both the content and locus of normativity are not set in stone, 
but that hegemonic discourses shift. This applies to intersectionality. What was 
intended to be a strategy of resistance and dissidence when deployed by and for those 
marginalized by structural operations of (patriarchal, colonial) power, can become a 
hegemonic one, and can tend towards appropriation if it is co-opted, as in the case of 
the commercial exploitation of Dzodan’s slogan. It can also become authoritarian if, 
in its name, unfashionable views are censored or closed down, rather than debated.  
I will turn now to my case studies: Monique Wittig, the French materialist 
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feminist who is sometimes acknowledged as a forerunner of queer (though 
significantly less frequently than her French male counterparts such as Jean Genet and 
Michel Foucault – a lacuna Clare Hemmings has pointed out and that she has 
attempted to redress13), and Shulamith Firestone, the Anglo-American radical feminist 
whose work emerged contemporaneously in the 1970s.14 While Wittig has a place in 
both the canon of separatist lesbian feminism and (proto-)queer theory, Firestone, as a 
heterosexual second-wave radical feminist, has not been considered in the context of 
proto-queer thought. She has, however, recently been adopted and utilized by the 
branch of feminist theory and activism know as xenofeminism, which is a ‘labour of 
bricolage, synthesizing cyberfeminism, posthumanism, accelerationism, 
neorationalism, materialist feminism […] in an attempt to forge a project suited to 
contemporary political conditions’.15 Xenofeminism, as distinct from the current, 
most hegemonic, feminist discourse in the West – intersectionality – recognizes itself 
precisely as ‘a politics without “the infection of purity”’,16 borrowing from discourses 
of which it can make use in a non-hierarchizing manner. The Deleuzian, 
posthumanist, and accelerationist elements of xenofeminism mark it out, however, 
from the queer perspective I am pursuing here since it imagines a subject of politics 
that is hybrid, post-human, and adaptive rather than resistant or counter-normative. 
However, the importance of the kind of work it is doing, especially in valorizing 
technology and rationality in an age in which ‘affect’ has become the dominant 
discourse in politics as in theory, should not be underplayed.17 
Here, I will be arguing that the discourse and logic employed by Firestone 
with regard to the institution of the family, reproduction, maternity, and biological 
determinism are eminently ‘queer’, in terms of the strategies deployed, if obviously 
not ‘lesbian’ in terms of identity politics. That is, they are queer along the lines of 
	 7
Michael Warner’s post-Foucauldian definition of queer as that which provides 
‘resistance to regimes of the normal’.18 Thinking Firestone’s writing in this way – as a 
counter-hegemonic, thought-experiment-led project – helps to bring into focus some 
of the problems of the trend for hyper-identity politics that characterizes some recent 
feminism. Rethinking second-wave feminism as ‘proto-queer’, then, offers a re-
evaluation of an important historical-political movement or set of movements.  
This article will focus mainly on two works published within a year of each 
other: Wittig’s experimental, non-linear novel of lesbian feminist revolution, Les 
Guérrillères (1969)19, and Firestone’s manifesto, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for 
Feminist Revolution (1970).20 In a series of intriguing ways, Wittig’s novel thematizes 
and gives poetic voice, slightly avant la lettre, to Firestone’s manifesto. Poignantly, 
Firestone wrote in The Dialectic of Sex of the historical absence of any properly 
feminist revolution that might serve as inspiration to her generation, adding 
‘Moreover, we haven’t even a literary image of this future society; there is not even a 
utopian feminist literature yet in existence’.21 Firestone would have been writing 
these words at the very time that Les Guérillères was being published in France.  
 
Female Forebears and Revolutionary Visions 
One obvious first point of commonality between Firestone and Wittig is the degree to 
which both locate the politics and philosophy of their feminism within a genealogy at 
the head of which we find French forebear Simone de Beauvoir. Firestone claims in 
The Dialectic of Sex that ‘of all feminist theorists De Beauvoir is the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching’, citing in particular her insight that ‘humanity is not 
an animal species, it is a historical reality’.22 Wittig names her 1981 essay ‘One is not 
born a woman’ after De Beauvoir’s oft-cited contention ‘One is not born, but rather 
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becomes, woman. No biological, psychical or economic destiny defines the figure that 
the human female takes on in society…’.23 And, building on this central tenet, 
Wittig’s essay begins ‘A materialist feminist approach to women’s oppression 
destroys the idea that women are a “natural group”’.24  
What both Firestone and Wittig seek to do in bringing together dialectical 
materialist approaches with a deployment of existentialist De Beauvoir is to challenge 
contemporary strands of feminist thought in each linguistic context that reify the 
‘naturalness’ of woman and the deterministic significance of her biological condition. 
In the French context, this was understood to be women writing in the Psych et Po 
tradition – the exponents of l’écriture feminine.25 In the Anglophone USA of the time, 
it was perhaps best exemplified by Mary Daly’s controversial and anti-trans version 
of feminism, with its notion of a specific ‘gyn/ergy’ proper to women understood as a 
biological and psychological group (that very ‘natural group’ disputed by Wittig).26 
As material feminists, both Wittig and Firestone recognize that women’s biology has 
been weaponized as a tool of patriarchal oppression. As Wittig writes: ‘there is but 
sex that is oppressed and sex that oppresses […] the category of sex is the product of 
a heterosexual society which imposes on women the rigid obligation of the 
reproduction of the “species”.27 But both writers refuse to perpetuate the deterministic 
significance of biology when imagining lesbian futures (Wittig) and feminist revolt 
(Firestone). In this direction, Firestone writes: ‘it has become necessary to free 
humanity from the tyranny of its biology’.28 This is an eminently proto-queer way of 
thinking against reductive ontology, and one that places them squarely 
philosophically apart from many of their respective contemporaries. 
The revolutionary societies imagined by Firestone and Wittig, in respectively 
manifesto and literary novelistic form, involve a radical re-imagining of the categories 
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of sexed and gendered identity. Having argued that women’s relegation to the role of 
‘sex class’ determines their/our continued oppression, Firestone writes: ‘The end goal 
of feminist revolution must be […] not just the elimination of male privilege, but of 
the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer 
matter culturally’.29 For Firestone, post-revolutionary society would no longer be 
organized on the basis of coupledom, heterosexual privilege, and nuclear families. 
Extending Freud’s already expanded notion of Eros, Firestone imagines societies 
organized in cross-generational groups, in which sexuality is not understood as a 
distinct form of experience or feeling from friendship, and in which the ‘belonging to’ 
of romantic love in the courtly tradition and of father-wife-child hierarchies cease to 
have meaning. Firestone’s utopia is a queer one in which, for all practical purposes, 
‘heterosex’ and ‘same-sex’ have little residual meaning, since the sense of the terms 
‘men’ and ‘women’ would be obsolete.  
Addressing the same issue, Wittig, true to the lyrical and self-reflexive nature 
of her textual project, enacts, at the linguistic level, an overcoming of this previously 
meaningful distinction via a play with pronouns that is prescient. The post-
revolutionary subjects of the society described in Les Guérillères will move through 
several stages of redefinition of the old binary sex-gender system, before renouncing 
it entirely. Wittig describes how, at one stage, the recently-victorious revolutionary 
subjects subvert the traditional French linguistic dominance paradigm of masculine 
over feminine, which holds that in a room containing ninety-nine women and one 
man, the collection of assembled humans will be referred to in the third person plural 
as ‘ils’ (masculine plural).30 Post-revolutionary subjects, female and male, formerly 
plural ‘ils’ are temporarily united as collective ‘elles’ (feminine plural) at this point in 
the text, marking for the first time female social supremacy, before abandoning the 
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system of gendered hierarchy altogether.31 
In imagining their utopian feminist societies, both authors seek to do away 
with work as an institution and as a structure for organizing the time, and ordering the 
use of space, of its citizen-subjects. Firestone writes of a society in which paid human 
labour is largely replaced by technology in the advanced cybernetic communism 
imagined, enabling work to be divorced from wages, allowing people to pursue 
occupations about which they are passionate, and freeing adults to spend time in 
creative play. Firestone also recognizes that some individuals, regardless of sex, 
function better as individuals; that not everyone will want to live in households of 
more than one or share caring duties. She writes that: ‘each person would be totally 
self-governing as soon as she was physically able’.32 This recognizes ‘the radical idea 
that that women are people’,33 and as such that they have differing degrees of 
sociability, interest in others, capacity for and desire to engage in caring, and what 
psychologists would call introversion or extroversion.  
Wittig, describes the post-revolutionary world thus:  
 
They say, the prisons are open and serve as doss houses. They 
say that they have broken with the tradition of inside and 
outside, that the factories have each knocked down one of 
their walls, that offices have been installed in the open air, on 
the esplanades, in the rice-fields.34  
 
These ways of reorganizing the experience of space and time – breaking down the 
categories of inside/outside, integrating work and play to remove the (according to 
Firestone, artificial) distinction between child and adult – may also remind us of 
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recent queer theorizations of time by authors such as Elizabeth Freeman and J. J. 
Halberstam.35 But rather than positing ‘queer time’ as the exception that shows up the 
workings of mainstream (straight) time, the province of outliers, both Wittig and 
Firestone will queer time for all post-revolutionary citizens, replacing the narrative of 
the reproductive life cycle and the capitalistic rituals of production with more flexible 
and multivalent ways of spending time. And in Les Guérrillères, Wittig organizes her 
fragmented text in a non-linear, non-chronological way, queering reading practice. 
The text consists of a collection of prose paragraphs, lines of verse intercut with the 
names of fallen female warriors, and circular symbols. Some of the prose paragraphs 
describe acts and events that are temporally located during the struggle of the 
guérrillères for ascendency, while some pre-date and others post-date the revolution. 
But the order in which Wittig presents us with them is apparently random, and our 
reading takes us forwards and backwards in time, creating a cyclical reading practice. 
This echoes some of the iconography of the text, such as the circular symbols that we 
learn are found on the pages of ‘feminaries’, sacred texts that the post-revolutionary 
women use to re-write a non-phallic, non-masculinist history and mythology for 
themselves – the self-representational tradition that was denied under patriarchy.36   
The debunking or rewriting of myths of identity and ontology feature 
prominently as strategies of resistance to ‘regimes of the normal’ in both texts. And 
both seek to render identity categories ultimately redundant, rather than multiplying 
and shoring up new ones – an eminently queer move. Both Firestone and Wittig 
engage in the deconstruction of myths about the nature of women that are as dear to 
some feminists as they are to the patriarchy from which they issue. Firestone 
expresses particular ire for the persistent myth of women’s natural maternal instinct, 
which she names as one of the barriers to technological invention that would free 
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women from the expectation of pregnancy:  
 
Fears of new methods of reproduction are so widespread that 
as of the time of this writing, 1969, the subject, outside of 
scientific circles, is still taboo. Even many women in the 
women’s liberation movement – perhaps especially in the 
women’s liberation movement – are afraid to express any 
interest in it for fear of confirming the suspicion that they are 
‘unnatural’, wasting a great deal of energy denying that they 
are anti-motherhood, pro-artificial reproduction and so on.37  
 
It is intriguing to note, given that the radical feminist revolution Firestone longed for 
has not happened, that attitudes and accompanying cultural and technological 
practices in this sphere have not changed as quickly or as much as other social 
attitudes and medical advances. One might suspect that the investment in keeping 
women reproducing the old-fashioned way, and putting energy into care-giving, 
works to the good of the prevailing social order, just as Firestone claimed. 
While Firestone works to counter the commonplace idea that women are 
naturally predisposed to be life-givers and caretakers, Wittig similarly undoes the 
notion of women as the gentler sex, challenging the logic underpinning the feminist 
ethics of care which holds that women are not innately predisposed to violence and 
force, but rather to nurturance. The very title of Les Guérillères bespeaks the novelty 
of imagining the feminist warrior. For this is not simply the feminine version of the 
noun meaning ‘warrior’ (le guerrier) in French. That would be ‘la guerrière’, which 
is a near homonym of Wittig’s coining. But the neologism Wittig creates with its 
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extra ‘L’s echoes the plural feminine pronoun ‘elles’, while also drawing on the 
semantics of ‘guerilla’ (‘guérilla’ in French) It sits awkwardly and strangely in the 
mind and on the tongue. Firestone has stated: ‘there have been women 
revolutionaries, certainly, but they have been used by male revolutionaries, who 
seldom gave even lip service to equality for women, let alone to a radical feminist 
restructuring of society’.38 Wittig’s inventive linguistic deformation articulates that 
something extra – not just, or not quite, a female warrior, but rather a warrior for 
feminism. (That the English translation leaves the French title intact engineers a 
parallel, if not quite identical, experience of an encounter with strangeness, newness – 
queerness – for the Anglophone reader.) Both Firestone and Wittig, then, resist the 
commonplace notions of what women are and what women are for: pacifistic, 
peaceful, life-giving, caregivers.  
 
Shadow Sisters 
In their resistant re-imaginings of feminist subjects and societies, these texts can be 
said to enact and embody part of what J. Jack Halberstam means by the concept of 
‘shadow feminism’, when they write in The Queer Art of Failure of ‘an antisocial 
femininity, and a refusal of the essential bond of mother and daughter that ensures 
that the daughter inhabits the legacy of the mother and in doing so reproduces her 
relationship to patriarchal forms of power’.39 In displacing the primacy of the mother-
daughter bond (which Firestone rejects as produced by patriarchal insistence on the 
closeness of women and children), and replacing it with the kinship of intellectual 
feminist inheritance (the symbolic mother of both dialectical projects being Simone 
de Beauvoir), kinship is strategic and chosen rather than progenitors being 
determined, as in the patriarchal mode. What this also means is that feminist bonds 
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can be rationalized or intellectualized. This is an intriguing refusal of the ascription to 
women of both emotionalism and biological determinism, even if it is limited as a 
strategy by being only a reversal or inversion, rather than a thoroughgoing 
deconstruction of the binary.  
The ideas in both authors’ works regarding the normative and oppressive 
functions of maternity, the nuclear family, pacifistic femininity, and the institution of 
childhood, prefigure the so-called antisocial turn in twenty-first-century queer theory, 
most often associated with Lee Edelman, as well as with Halberstam and 
others.  Antisocial queer describes a queerness that is not recuperable for the interests 
of the status quo, and that does not accept any form of assimilation. It issues instead a 
stark ‘no’ to the narrative of family values-inflected futurism. This branch of queer 
theory has, however, for all its anti-identitarian claims, been rather gay male in 
orientation. For example, Edelman’s book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death 
Drive of 2004, what we might call the bible of anti-social queer, posits a figure, 
borrowed from the system of Lacanian psychoanalysis – ‘the sinthomosexual’ – as the 
embodiment of a queer resistance to norms. (Sinthome means in psychoanalytic 
discourse both symptom and saintly man/ human. Edelman fuses the term with the 
word ‘homosexual’.) This figure is not per se sexed or gendered, yet all of the literary 
and filmic figures Edelman chooses to illustrate the function of the sinthomosexual 
are male, including Ebenezer Scrooge, Hannibal Lecter, and various protagonists of 
Hitchcock’s films. Where, then, we might ask, are the equivalent feminist figures of 
resistance to what Edelman calls ‘reproductive futurity’? Quite simply, the answer 
might be that they are back in the 1970s. Wittig’s revolutionary lesbian guérillères, 
who refuse the meaning of ‘woman’ as peaceful and submissive complement to man, 
and who forge new ways of being and living outside of the straight paradigm, are 
	 15
such figures. Firestone’s woman who refuses the cultural imperative of pregnancy and 
motherhood as natural and inevitable is such a figure. Firestone writes: ‘pregnancy is 
the temporary deformation of the body of the individual for the sake of the species’.40 
She explicitly and repeatedly calls for a feminist future that is not organized around 
the reproductive lifecycle and in which maternity is not seen as inevitable.  
Moreover, Firestone’s work suggests ways of overcoming the 
individualism/collectivism binary that so much visionary political writing gets caught 
up in. As seen in the recognition that it is unacceptable to expect a given woman to 
sacrifice her bodily integrity ‘for the sake of the species’, Firestone recognizes that 
female selfhood has not yet been sufficiently articulated as a liveable possibility, such 
that refusing to sacrifice becomes a feminist act. This causes her to reflect upon her 
love, as a child, for those Donald Duck comics that featured Uncle Scrooge McDuck 
in the following terms: ‘I loved the selfish extravagance of his bathing in money. 
(Many women – deprived of Self – have confessed the same girlhood passion.)’.41 
Just as Edelman uses the human Scrooge as an embodiment of the function of the 
sinthomosexual, so the young Firestone was fascinated by his animated, ducky alter-
ego, and uses it to illustrate the shortage of available examples of female selfishness, 
female subjectivity, outside of the roles allocated to those in the sex-class. In the face 
of a series of Stepford Wife stereotypes for girls in the 1960s, one can see the 
rebellious pleasure found in identification with an imaginary figure whose self-regard 
and self-indulgence know no bounds, who will sacrifice itself for nothing. (That the 
figure chosen queers both gender and species is perhaps not incidental.)  
Along similar lines, Wittig echoes the rebellion of refusing to sacrifice when 
she explains in ‘The Straight Mind’ how members of oppressed classes do not easily 
find themselves as subjects through collectivist struggles, such as Marxist politics, 
	 16
which risk simply reinscribing their belonging to a class. She writes of the ‘real 
necessity for everyone to exist as an individual’, while arguing simultaneously that 
‘without class and class consciousness there are no real subjects, only alienated 
individuals’.42 In their different ways, then, Firestone and Wittig both queer the 
commonplace discourse that women are predisposed to commonality and group 
belonging, sounding the warning that dismissing the validity of a notion of selfish and 
self-interested female individuality perpetuates harmful and oppressive norms. This 
awareness on the part of writers of the second wave stands in stark contrast to much 
twenty-first-century feminist discourse, in which feminists are constantly reminded to 
police other feminists and themselves to ensure that they are centring others with less 
privilege in their activism. While one might decide to take on this intersectional ethic 
as a political project, it is a blanket demand that, I would contend, it is unreasonable 
of feminism to place on women.  
 
Some Concluding Remarks 
The particular flavour of antisocial feminism offered by Firestone and Wittig, then, 
stands as a stark gesture of resistance to the commonly issued instruction to women to 
be for the other. It also provides a specifically feminist-voiced refusal of familiar and 
tainted narratives of sociality, family, and the future that are lacking in Edelman’s 
work. In an essay entitled ‘The Antisocial Turn in Queer Studies’ from 2008, 
Halberstam called for a queer that would be more indebted to punk than to Lacan, 
arguing that Edelman loses any claim to being radical precisely when he reveals his 
reverential thrall to male philosophical authorities and archetypes.43 Yet, to argue that 
we need to take seriously Wittig and Firestone as alternative proto-antisocial voices is 
obviously not to claim ideological perfection for them. It is, rather, to do away with 
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the demand for ideological perfection. We should be able to acknowledge flaws and 
blindspots in a writer’s work that are the effects of cultural-historical conditions 
without dismissing entirely their importance. So, Firestone’s vision of a social 
organization outside of the nuclear family leads her to (what many have considered) 
ethically dubious speculations about the validity of intergenerational sex and the 
removal of the incest taboo. Similarly, as much recent feminist work has addressed, 
including other articles in this special issue, it needs to be acknowledged that much 
white feminist writing of the 1970s was neglectful of issues specifically affecting 
non-white women, poor women, and uneducated women. This is certainly true of 
Firestone, who tends to write of ‘African Americans’ and ‘women’, as if these terms 
pertain to distinct categories of social subject, rendering women of colour utterly 
invisible and silencing their specific intersectional issues, as identified by Crenshaw 
and others. And the pointed critique of pronatalism contained in both Firestone and 
Edelman doubtless operates with a white bias, given that some subjects (rich and/or 
white) are more incentivized to reproduce than others (poor and/or black), as in the 
case of the coerced sterilization of women of colour, unmarried mothers, and 
immigrants at various moments in twentieth-century US history.44 Finally, in spite of 
her claims that, post-revolution, sex difference as we know it will disappear, as it is 
the effect of hetero-patriarchy, Firestone’s text is at moments guilty of considerable 
heterosexual bias and naturalization of straight romantic tropes.  
Returning purposefully to these texts, then, does not mean that we should 
simply ignore any ethical problems or lack of awareness of the material reality of 
other women that they propagate as a result of their positioning in time, space, and 
habitus. Similarly, in thinking about the intellectual sources they acknowledge, it 
must be noted that both Wittig and Firestone retain and extensively repurpose Marx 
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(and in Firestone’s case, Freud), alongside De Beauvoir, as the basis for their 
theorization of materialist revolt and what I have been terming anti-normative 
resistance. It would perhaps be unfair to insist that, whereas Edelman’s fidelity to 
Lacan renders him less than radical, these feminists’ use of the names and ideas of 
their male intellectual forebears is wholly unproblematic. But, crucially, while it is 
reasonable to acknowledge some flaws and problems in the eccentric and visionary 
writing of Wittig and Firestone, it is not reasonable to consign them to history as 
relics, as too many already seem to have done, especially in the case of seldom-read 
Firestone. For, in numerous ways, the ideas, textual strategies, and forms of resistance 
to imposed norms that pass as natural or ‘righteous’ in works by both of these writers 
make them significant precursors to ways of thinking that the queer academy and 
queer activism, as well as feminists of all stripes, would do well to engage with still 
today.   
																																																								
1 Susan Archer Mann and Douglas J. Huffman, ‘The Decentering of Second Wave 
Feminism and the Rise of the Third Wave’, Science and Society 69:1 (2005), 56-91 
(57). 
2 Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersections of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine’, University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 1 (1989), 139-167 (140).  
3 Flavia Dzodan, ‘My Feminism will be intersectional or it will be bullshit!’, Tiger 
Beatdown, http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/10/10/my-feminism-will-be-intersectional-
or-it-will-be-bullshit/  
	 19
																																																																																																																																																														
4 See: Aja Romana, ‘This feminist’s most famous quote has been sold all over the 
internet. She hasn’t seen a cent’, Vox, 
https://www.vox.com/2016/8/12/12406648/flavia-dzodan-my-feminism-will-be-
intersectional-merchandise  
5 Mann and Huffman, ‘The Decentering of Second Wave Feminism’, 87. 
6 Linda Gordon, ‘“Intersectionality”, Socialist Feminism and Contemporary Activism: 
Musings by a Second-Wave Socialist Feminist’, Gender and History 28:2 (2016), 
340-357, 347.  
7 Gordon, ‘“Intersectionality”’, 347. 
8 https://everydayfeminism.com/ 
9 I use ‘identity category violation’, a play on the concept of ‘category violation’ 
borrowed from linguistics, to describe those subject positions that demonstrate the 
flimsiness (and logical falseness) of political group identity that often passes as 
monolithic. A key example of such an illegible political subject position would be the 
far-right-wing feminist-identified lesbian. Without appropriate tools to understand and 
analyze those who fall outside of the rules of identitarianism, we lack a means of 
comprehending difficult or unpalatable subject positions. See Lisa Downing, ‘The 
Body Politic: Gender, the Right Wing, and “Identity Category Violations”’, French 
Cultural Studies 29:4 (2018, in press). 
10 Naomi Zack, Inclusive Feminism: A Third-Wave Theory of Women’s Commonality 
(Oxford: Rowman and Little, 2005), 7. 
11 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, The History of Sexuality 1 [1976], 
translated by Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 95. 
12 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 96. 
	 20
																																																																																																																																																														
13 Clare Hemmings, Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
14 There has been considerably more critical attention paid to Wittig’s ongoing 
relevance than to Firestone’s, until very recently. Key critical works on Wittig 
include: Namascar Shaktini (ed.) On Monique Wittig: Theoretical, Political, and 
Literary Essays (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005) and Benoît 
Auclerc and Yannick Chevalier, Lire Monique Wittig aujourd’hui (Lyon: Presses 
universitaires de Lyon, 2010). Two book-length works devoted to Firestone have been 
published since her death. They are: Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford (eds.), 
Further Adventures of The Dialectic of Sex (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 
and Victoria Margree, Neglected or Misunderstood: The Radical Feminism of 
Shulamith Firestone (London: Zero Books, 2018). Here, Margree argues for a serious 
reappraisal of Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex, which has been described by Ann 
Snitow as a ‘“demon text” of second wave feminism’ (3). 
15 Helen Hester, Xenofeminism (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 1.  
16 Hester, Xenofeminism, 1. 
17 For the affective turn in theory see: The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, ed. 
Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 2007). The place of affect in the genealogy of thought is a significant one, 
given the othering of emotion for much of history, but feminist projects that associate 
feminist ethics with feeling (e.g. the ‘ethics of care’), rather than undertaking an 
engagement with reason, risk perpetuating an age-old model in which women/ the 
feminine are aligned with feeling and the body; men/ the masculine with thought and 
spirit.  
	 21
																																																																																																																																																														
18 Michael Warner, Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xxvii.  
19 Monique Wittig, Les Guérillères  [1969], translated by David Le Vay (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1985). 
20 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution [1970] 
(London: Paladin, 1972). 
21 Firestone, Dialectic, 211. 
22 Firestone, Dialectic, 16. 
23 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex [1949], translated by Constance Borde and 
Sheila Malovany-Chevalier; introduction by Sheila Rowbotham (London: Vintage, 
2014), P? 
24 Monique Wittig, ‘The Straight Mind’ in The Straight Mind and Other Essays 
(Boston: Beacon, 1992), 9-20 (9). 
25 Though it should be noted, as in Anne Emmanuelle Berger’s contribution to this 
Special Issue, that recent scholarship is working to complexify the notion that this 
branch of feminist theory was straightforwardly biologically essentialist. 
26 Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1978). 
27 Wittig, ‘The Category of Sex’ in The Straight Mind, 1-8 (2; 6).  
28 Firestone, Dialectic, 183. 
29 Firestone, Dialectic, 19. 
30 Currently, a campaign is afoot to reform the French language in order to avoid this 
sexist practice, under the name ‘écriture inclusive’. The Académie française is 
proving, thus far, resistant to its aims. See, for example, this article in Le monde by 
Raphaëlle Rérolle as 13/12/2017: 
	 22
																																																																																																																																																														
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/12/13/ecriture-inclusive-malaise-a-l-
academie-francaise_5228736_3232.html 
31 This linguistic inversion of gendered power works, of course, in the heavily 
gendered French language in which Wittig writes, but fails to register in English 
translation. Indeed Le Vay’s constant translation of ‘elles’ as ‘the women’ rather than 
‘they’ silences the fact that sometimes those belonging to the class of person formerly 
known as men are being referenced in Wittig’s plural ‘elles’. 
32 Firestone, Dialectic, 222. 
33 This definition of feminism has a contested origin. It is often attributed to Cheris 
Kramarae, but it has been argued that this is a misattribution and has been linked to 
Marie Shear. See: http://www.beverlymcphail.com/feminismradicalnotion.html 
34 Wittig, Les Guérillères, 131. 
35 Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010); J. Jack Halberstam In a Queer Time 
and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York, NYU Press, 2005). 
36 Wittig, Les Guérillères, 51.   
37 Firestone, Dialectic, 188. 
38 Firestone, Dialectic, 211. 
39 J. Jack Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 124. 
40 Firestone, Dialectic, 188. 
41 Firestone, Dialectic, 152. 
42 Wittig, ‘The Straight Mind’, 19. 
43 Judith Halberstam, ‘The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies’, Graduate Journal of 
Social Science 5:2 (2008), 140-156. 
	 23
																																																																																																																																																														
44 See, for example, J. David Smith, The Eugenic Assault on America: Scenes in Red, 
White and Black (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1992). 
